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Can the EU Carbon Tax the U.S.
in retaliation?
Annum Rashedi

P

resident-elect Trump emphasized pulling the United
States of America (“U.S.”) out of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Climate
Agreement[hereinafter Paris Agreement]1, despite the executive
agreement ratification by President Obama earlier this year.2 In
fact, Trump called for a cease of all U.S. tax dollars payments
to U.N. global climate change programs and a withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement in his first 100 days in office.3 Contrary to
Trump’s intentions, Article 28 of the Paris Agreement stipulates
that a party which has ratified, as the U.S. did on September
3rd, 2016, may not withdraw from the Paris Agreement before
four years.4 Article 28 was artfully designed to protect against
potential withdrawal of support by changing Heads of States. In
response to Trump, current French Presidential-nominee Sarkozy said he would demand France and the European Union
(“EU”) place a one to three percent carbon tax at its border for
all products coming from the U.S.5 The purpose of this paper is
to determine whether the proposed carbon tax would be innovative, and if implemented by the EU, would it be a discriminatory
measure for the carbon tax to solely be on U.S. imports.

A “novel” concept
The notion of a carbon tax is not novel unless it is used as
a trade sanction. In practice, a carbon tax would be considered
a type of tariff or a border tax adjustment (“BTA”).6 Under
the Kyoto Protocol talks in December of 2006, John Hontelez,
Secretary General of the European Environmental Bureau stated,
“[BTAs] might be the answer . . . EU firms would be protected
against unfair, carbon-careless competition from outside.”7 In
contrast, the EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson hinted
that a “specific ‘climate’ tariff on countries that have not ratified
Kyoto . . . would be highly problematic under current [WTO]
rules, and almost impossible to implement in practice.”8 Here,
however, the Paris Agreement, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, has
been ratified by the U.S. and the WTO rules are ambiguous when
it comes to BTAs.9
BTAs are permissible under GATT’s Article III, “National
Treatment” clause which allows for taxation on imports10 so long
as the tax imposed on imported goods is no greater than the tax
established for similar domestic products.11 Nonetheless, such
a BTA may not be permissible under GATT’s Article I, “Most
Favored Nation” clause because it does not permit taxation to be
levied on one state and not others, equally.12 Thus, a carbon tax
on U.S. imports could be framed as a WTO permissible ‘border
adjustment’ of a domestic carbon tax but its success depends
on other factors. Essentially, the EU would be using this BTA
as a method of retaliation, a trade sanction for leaving the Paris
18

Agreement after ratification, in order to protect the environment,
incentivize “greening,” and make a statement to demonstrate the
importance of the Paris Agreement.

Arguments before the Panel
Although BTAs are designed with the intent of maintaining economic competitiveness, the carbon tax on U.S. imports
could be non-discriminatory if the EU could successfully argue
that it falls under one of the exemptions of GATT Article XX.
Specifically, the EU would likely argue that the carbon tax falls
under two exemptions to the GATT, Article XX (b)“for measures
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant, life or health”13
and GATT, Article XX (g) “for measures relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources”14 because such a carbon
tax would protect human, animal, and plant, life and health
while endeavoring to cut CO2 emissions, slowing and eventually
reversing climate change.
In response, the U.S. would argue an Article I:1 claim because
the EU is clearly discriminating only against the U.S. and not
other WTO members.15 Additionally, the U.S. could argue that
the carbon tax does not fall under the exemptions embodied in
GATT Article XX because the carbon tax discriminates against
its imports as compared to EU domestic products or imported
goods from other countries. Moreover, the WTO stands by two
non-discrimination principles that stipulate a member shall not
discriminate, (a) between “like” products from different trading
partners16 and (b) between its own and like foreign products.17
These two principles safeguard the world’s liberal free trading
system from discriminatory measures, especially protectionist
measures. Here, the proposed carbon tax would cover all U.S.
imports entering the EU, so the definition of “like” products
would have to be greatly expanded to include carbon footprints.
The EU could advance the argument that any product emitting one ton of carbon would be considered a “like product” akin
to any other product similarly emitting one ton of carbon.18 When
it comes to BTAs and “like” products, WTO jurisprudence has
consistently applied the recommendations of the Working Party
on BTAs19 which determines “likeness” by (1) the product’s
end-uses, (2) consumers’ tastes and habits, and (3) the product’s
properties, nature and quality. A uniform carbon tax affecting
all U.S. imports into the EU would not be reasonably attributed
“like” product(s) status even if the policy objectives for such a
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tax were considered legitimate environmental policy goals to
address climate change.20
While a carbon tax may be a successful form of retaliation to the U.S. abandoning the Paris Agreement, it may not be
the most efficient use of a carbon tax since this tax would not
comply with the EU’s international trade obligations under the
WTO. There is no doubt that such a tax would greatly affect the
U.S. in its trade and economy due to its close trading relationship with the EU. The U.S. greatest concern would be leakage
— carbon-intensive industries being encouraged to move out of
the U.S. to countries where they will not be subjected to such a
carbon tax — as this would be damaging to the U.S. economy.21
While, the EU could have a short-term gain, both economies
would suffer long-term, and the ultimate goal of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions would be undermined. A successful
carbon tax does not aim to discriminate or openly act as a form
of retaliation.22 For example, if the EU levied carbon taxes on
all steel manufacturers, imports and exports alike, it would be

non-discriminatory. The WTO would not likely find discrimination where a carbon tax is structured to follow domestic climate
policy objectives, and does not discriminate in favor of domestic
producers or favor imports from certain countries over others.23
Nonetheless, the chances of such a carbon tax surviving a
WTO panel is unlikely. The EU could not successfully impose a
carbon tax only on U.S. imports because such a carbon tax would
be openly discriminatory and obviously targeted at one trading
partner. The EU would have to narrow the application of the
carbon tax to be levied on certain products made under certain
conditions or lacking sustainable or “green” elements. Further
such a carbon tax would have to equally apply to all imports of
that product, not only U.S. products being imported. The WTO
aims to prevent discriminatory measures that restrict the flow of
trade, such a carbon tax while implemented for the greater good,
combatting climate change, nevertheless, would ultimately fail.
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